Lessons Learned Katrina Hurricane

Editor: We’ve received feedback from one person who participated in the response to Katrina in an area that might be called the Red Zone. Their observations on what worked and what didn’t work are important lessons learned.

 1.    We found volunteers who were not personally prepared.

Volunteers were in the area without the proper kind and amount of clothing, toiletries, and medications. We found some who did not have a sleeping bag, a flashlight, or a safety-reflector belt. It might be a good idea to develop a pre-deployment checklist so that these items are not overlooked. Also, gathering important items and placing them in a pre-packed bag will save lots of time in the short hours just prior to departure. Do allow extra space for specific clothing or items based on the incident need. For example one can add cold-weather gear if an incident is in a cold region. Volunteers that lacked these items became a burden on others. The military we saw came with the proper personal supplies.

2. There were volunteers who were not healthy when they arrived.

Volunteers who are not healthy should not be able to depart until becoming healthy again. Those that were sick became part of the problem by utilizing resources intended for disaster victims. A personal supply of medications for volunteers is critical. Insufficient supplies of medication for volunteers were a big problem. Volunteers should be self-sufficient throughout the deployment period.

3. Personal medical privacy laws (HIPPA) hindered the delivery of care for area residents.

Volunteers and persons affected by the disaster need pre-signed medical releases to be kept available for emergencies. Sharing of medical information on individuals hindered the general delivery of medical care. We note that members of the Armed Forces have such a signed release under their Commanders control.

4. Volunteers we talked with generally lacked a clear purpose and mission and they didn’t seem aware of what their chain of command was when we asked to speak with their leadership.

The lack of purpose and direction can create dysfunctional teams. Too much time and energy is wasted in this process if not clearly outlined. As we know, the incident itself drives the response. When the incident changes, the response changes. We saw volunteers who did not know that their mission should have changed and some whose personal egos were blocking the ability of their teams to change. This is the wrong time and location to have egos outweigh the needs of others. Such adaptability must be part of predeployment training.

5. Communications are and will be the biggest challenge in a disaster area. 

We found low tech was the way to go for at least the first 72 hours. We quickly adopted the FRS radio over other methods of wireless communication. In our case small Cobra radios were ideal given the hardship environment. Our team could communicate in a small area up to about 500 meters, any further and they would not work.

6. Volunteer leaders need to know strength's and weakness of their volunteers to make the highest and best use of volunteers.

We spoke to many volunteers who were simply happy to be helping others in the Katrina disaster. When we pressed them we learned many volunteers had skills and abilities that were not being better utilized. Furthermore for some reason they did not tell their leadership of this mismatch. We suggest when time allows volunteer leaders should ask each volunteer what they feel they can contribute.